RC&E Chill - Industrial Refrigeration and Process Safety / Risk Management

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Why does my PSM program make me review the PHA during any equipment/facility MOC?

February 13, 2017 /

Nearly two years ago, I changed the Management of Change Written Plan template in my PSM programs to make a few changes:

  • Removed the “minor change” and “major change” categories.
  • Explicitly require a Process Hazard Analysis review during all equipment/facility MOC’s.
  • Explicitly require a Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) before startup for all equipment/facility MOC’s and suggesting that it be conducted by someone other than the person that performed the MOC procedure.

These changes are related and they were made for a few reasons, which broadly break into three categories:

  1. PSM Guidance History
  2. Lessons Learned from Audits, Citations, and Incidents
  3. Plan Simplification

PSM Guidance History: There are two main ongoing issues with the NH3 refrigeration industry’s understanding of MOC. The first is the fiction that there are “minor” and “major” categories of changes in the PSM/RMP rules. It seems that the example written plan provided in the first edition of the IIAR Compliance Guidelines has been so internalized into our industry that people have stopped looking at the actual regulations or guidance documents from OSHA & the EPA. Essentially, the IIAR guidance splits changes into either “minor” or “major” based on whether they invalidate the PHA. If they do invalidate the PHA, they are “major” changes, and if they don’t, they are “minor” changes. This (arguably useful) fiction is NOT present in the PSM/RMP MOC rules.

Here’s the relevant IIAR guidance on “minor” changes:

“When processes undergo minor changes (e.g., minor rerouting of a piping run), information is typically added to a PHA file to reflect the change, even though the validity of the PHA is not affected by the modification.”

Here’s the relevant IIAR guidance on “major” changes:

“A major change is a modification which has significant impact on process conditions or system parameters and was not addressed by a previous Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) study.”

If that’s your policy, then the IIAR is already telling you that the PHA should be reviewed during the change. Why? How could you possibly know if the change “was not addressed by a previous PHA study” or whether the “Validity of the PHA is not affected by the modification” without reviewing the PHA?

Since the IIAR guidance (and experience) tell us we have to review the PHA as part of the change, there is little benefit to the IIAR scheme of “minor” and “major” changes. You can’t justifiably determine which category the change falls into until after you’ve reviewed the PHA. Unfortunately, that’s not what was happening…

Lessons Learned: PSM covered facilities have a LONG history of failing to properly manage changes. You would be stunned to see some of the changes that occur in covered processes without undergoing an adequate MOC procedure – or without any MOC at all. We’ve seen entire machine rooms added with no PHA review because the facility felt that the change was a “minor” change. The reality of implementing the IIARs guidance was that people were deciding if a change was “minor” or “major” based on their gut feeling of the size/complexity of the change – They weren’t actually reviewing the PHA to make this determination. The IIAR scheme acted as a “shortcut” for many facilities as they tried to jam ever larger & more complex changes into the “minor” category.

Furthermore, we found that almost none of these poorly performed MOC procedures were being caught by the facility. Since one person was in charge of (and administering) the entire program, there was essentially NO oversight. Adding the PSSR at the end of the equipment / facility MOC procedure provided a degree of oversight.

Simplification: Removing the “minor” and “major” categories meant that all equipment / facility changes followed the same procedural steps. Each equipment / facility change now requires the “Responsible Person” to review the relevant PHA section(s). Please note that this is not a full-scale team-based exercise – it’s the “Responsible Person” reading through the relevant section(s) and making a determination based on their expertise. Obviously, as in all other cases, if the “Responsible Person” is encouraged to seek any operational or engineering expertise they might lack. If the PHA section(s) appears unaffected by the change, then that’s the end of the issue until the regularly scheduled PHA revalidation. If, however, the PHA section(s) appears to be affected, then they need to be revalidated by a team meeting the requirements of 1910.119(e) & 40CFR§68.75.

Also, added at this time were individual component PSSR sheets. That is, for each common type of equipment in an NH3 refrigeration system, a sheet was created that allowed you to quickly document the Pre-Startup Safety Review. These sheets covered various required PSI items as well as IIAR Bulletin 109 items that have been commonly requested and IIAR Bulletin 110 inspection & maintenance items. Since, this PSSR is required (by the Written Plan) for every equipment / facility change, they provide a oversight function as well as meeting the regulatory requirements.

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All of these changes are made to improve the MOC & PSSR process.

To meet the requirements of the MOC element 1910.119(l)(2)(ii) you have to “assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to the change: …Impact of change on safety and health.” If you haven’t read this OSHA MOC guidance recently, I highly commend it to you:

An MOC procedure is required anytime a change per the requirements of 1910.119(l) is considered. An MOC procedure is a proactive management system tool used in part to determine if a change might result in safety and health impacts. OSHA’s MOC requirement is prospective.

The standard requires that an MOC procedure be completed, regardless of whether any safety and health impacts will actually be realized by the change. The intent is, in part, to have the employer analyze any potential safety and health impacts of a change prior to its implementation. Even if the employer rightly concludes there would be no safety and health impacts related to a change, 1910.119(l)(1) still requires the employer to conduct the MOC procedure.

The MOC requirements are important because many large incidents have occurred in the past when changes have been made and the employer either did not consider the safety and health impacts of the change, or did not appreciate (wrongly concluded) the potential consequences of the change before it was too late. Therefore, it is not only required, but important that the employer conducts an MOC procedure on each change, even those changes the employer believes will have no safety or health impacts. (OSHA, Refinery PSM NEP, 2007)

It is the word prospective in the above text that is most important. You can think of the dictionary-like definition of “a study that starts with the current condition and follows it into the future.” You could also think of those men and women who panned for gold in the western territories of the US during the 19th century.  Like them, you are looking through a lot of mundane things to find the rare oddity – that unique nugget – that can cause trouble.  In an MOC the nugget is a hazard that needs a safeguard – either a new one, or one you already have but haven’t yet applied to the discovered hazard.

Where do you document the hazards you’ve found and the safeguards you’ve put in place? The Process Hazard Analysis!

What questions should I expect during a ChemNEP inspection?

February 6, 2017 /

A friend in the industry recently went through an OSHA ChemNEP inspection on their NH3 Refrigeration System. Over the years, I’ve had the pleasure of working with many of their team members and have audited several of their facilities. They use an older version of the PSM/RM Program templates that I currently offer. They were kind enough to provide the (paraphrased) Dynamic List questions they were asked by the inspector.

What follows are those questions and my thoughts on how those questions are addressed in the current templates. Furthermore, there are often some additional questions you can ask to ensure you can document compliance with the PSM/RMP rules if you are asked these questions.

Black text concerns the question that was asked. Colored text are my thoughts on the responses for people that use the templates I provide.

Primary / Generic Question Pool

 Do EAP procedures include small and large release plan?

This is a difficult one to answer as we don’t include the Emergency Action Plan (which could include evacuations due to Bomb Threats, Terrorism, Fires, Earthquakes, Floods, etc.) or Emergency Response Plan in our PSM templates. (There are usually pre-existing S&H documents that can be modified to include the covered process rather than re-inventing the wheel.) What we DO provide are the “element guideline” and a template to get you started on your 1910.119(n) required “procedure for handling small releases” with the guidance that large releases are going to handled under the Emergency Action / Response Plan. We DO check that the EAP/ERP covers large releases in PHA’s and Compliance Audits and make appropriate recommendations when they address the issue. Is your PSM covered process integrated into your EPA/ERP?

 

 Are Initial PHA and subsequent PHA (Revalidations) completed every five years?

The template program directs the client to do this and the PHA revalidation schedule (and other routine PSM tasks) is included in the MI-EL1 Mechanical Integrity Schedule. Are you providing this at the frequency required in the PSM system?

 

 Are PHA, Incident Investigations and Compliance Audit recommendations properly addressed?

The templates provide compliant tools, a central location for all recommendations and an easy-to-use tracking sheet but it’s up to the client to address these items. Furthermore, the template Management System includes policy on how these recommendations are resolved. We have always made ourselves available for assistance and we’re fairly aggressive in closing out any contractor issues with the assistance of the Engineering / Service departments. Are you implementing the “Implementation Policy: Resolution of Recommendations” section which includes guidance on when it is appropriate to justifiably decline a recommendation? Have you provided adequate documentation to prove you have addressed the recommendations?

 

Has the employer fully implemented MOC procedures including updating PSI, operating procedures and training?

The templates provide streamlined MOC policies/procedures for Personnel, Documents/Procedures, Car-Seal and Equipment Changes. Are these procedures being implemented as necessary and are they being adequately documented to prove it?

 

Has employer defined the safe upper and lower operating limits?

We document this robustly in our templates and have recently made further improvements in the templates (Dec2016-Jan2017) which make it even simpler for updated programs. If you are using older versions of these templates, please consider updating the SOPs – perhaps as part of a regularly scheduled review program. If you break the work up, most facilities can make these changes fairly easily internally.

 

NH3 Specific PSM Questions

How were the ventilation calculations developed and what standards were used?

This should be provided by your installing contractor/engineering firm. The templates include an example of “compliant” documentation on this and we’ve seen that OSHA/EPA find it acceptable in the field. A common issue here is that an engineering document is provided that is not clear to non-engineers. Also common is that the document doesn’t provide the design basis RAGAGEP or states a RAGAGEP that is different than the one stated elsewhere in the program for design basis RAGAGEP.

When was your most recent ammonia charge? How do you verify ammonia purity?

If your contractor provided the NH3 they should be able to help answer this. The template PSM program includes a ROSOP QA (Quality Assurance) SOP that addresses this. You should demand and store a Certificate of Analysis during NH3 charging. As for ongoing purity tests, our MI program templates directs you to perform the NH3 purity test for water per IIAR Bulletin 110. Are you doing this at the frequency required in the RAGAGEP/PSM system? Are you documenting it adequately?

 

Show me a low side vessel data label that shows MDMT (This was answered using the U1A and MAWP and MDMT information). Verification of current operating conditions was also required.

Your installing contractor/engineering firm should provide this info but it’s up to you to run within the limits. Are you checking this during routine walkthroughs? Do your SOPs show acceptable ranges for operation and are these ranges inside the acceptable design window provided in the PSI?

 

Show me the process for draining oil from your system. How many oil pots are in the system? Is there a separate SOP for each oil pot, who drains the oil pots, have the operators been trained on the procedure and can you verify the equipment specific training?

Note that this is a “show me” type question so it’s imperative that the operators asked this question refer to the appropriate SOP. Template SOPs provide equipment specific oil drain SOP Procedural Sections. Can you document that your operators have received and understood this training? If contractors are providing the service, can they document that their technicians have received and understood the training? Are you (or your contractors) providing it at the frequency required in the RAGAGEP/PSM system? Are you documenting it adequately?

 

Is there external corrosion or ice build up on the refrigeration equipment? What is the frequency of removing ice on liquid pumps? What is the frequency of the PM? Is each asset maintained individually or as a group and when was the PM completed?

This is addressed in our MI program templates during walk-through’s as well as on each individual ITPMR which asks about excessive ice build-up. Are you implementing the walk-through and ITPMR at the frequency required in the RAGAGEP/PSM system? Are you documenting it adequately?

 

Are system logs used to document system conditions? The focus was on the continuous monitoring of the control system as well as the alarming and who receives the alarms.

If you use a modern control system (such as AEC) you likely have adequate logging. Walk-through documentation could help prove compliance. Are you implementing the walk-through at the frequency required in the RAGAGEP/PSM system Are you documenting the walk-through adequately? Hopefully you have addressed the alarm system in an SOP (either the System 101 ROSOP or the NH3/Vent ROSOP) so you have documented what happens to alarms. These questions should have been asked in the PHA.

 

With the exception of evaporators, condensers and associated piping is all equipment in a machinery room? What design codes and standards were used?

The first question directly out of IIAR 2-2014 which changed the rules a bit on equipment outside of a machinery room. It’s been roughly 3 years since that RAGAGEP came out and we are now seeing the question pop up RIGHT ON SCHEDULE. If you haven’t already compared your system to the 2014 IIAR 2, it would be appropriate to conduct a Gap Analysis (perhaps in conjunction with the PHA revalidation) to see where you stand. The template system documents the RAGAGEP itself clearly in a letter in the PSI.

 

Are machinery room doors and wall penetrations designed to be tight fitting with no gaps or openings. The focus was on door closers and gaskets around the perimeter of the doors. Verification that signage was on each door identifying restricted access was also required.

I’ve never seen this go as deep as door gaskets – frankly, we’ve always interpreted this far looser. Machinery rooms are designed to be negative-pressure areas (compared to other parts of the building) so this has not usually been a major concern. We certainly have seen it cited before where pipe penetrations through the machinery room wall were not sealed. Ask your technicians & safety people to look at this. Signage that meets IIAR 2 should have been evaluated as part of your PSSR, PHA and Compliance Audits.

 

Is access to the machinery room restricted to authorized personnel? How does the facility manage access, does the fire department have access, for the automatic door access where are these located, who has keys to the doors.

This is an issue you should have addressed in PHAs if you followed our PHA what-if checklist template. If you haven’t, there’s no reason not a do a quick mini-PHA on the issue.

 

How are the facility ammonia detectors tested and inspected? What is the frequency? Who inspected? What calibration procedures were used? Verification of the last two PM’s conducted.

This was a significant point of contention for this inspection (in part) because they used an older version of the template which does not include recent revisions (over the past two years) to improve the MI performance of the template program. The current template includes: 1) Integrated MI procedures into the SOPs & 2) ITPMRs (Inspection, Testing & Preventative Maintenance Records) for standardized MI documentation. Are you implementing the ITPMRs at the frequency required in the RAGAGEP/PSM system? Are you documenting it adequately?

 

OSHA replaces the ChemNEP inspection protocol

January 22, 2017 /

Since 2011, Ammonia Refrigeration facilities with 10,000lbs. or more of Anhydrous Ammonia have been subject to ChemNEP inspections under CPL 03-00-14. OSHA has replaced this program with a new program that makes some changes:

  • Merges the Petroleum and Chemical NEPs into a single Program1
  • Targets EPA Risk Management Program level 1 & 2 as well as Program 3
  • Requires “State Plan” adoption

The details of the new program are posted in the new CPL 03-00-021 which is available on the OSHA website or, if you use our templates, in the References section of the Google Drive shared folders. Here are some highlights of the new inspection program:

  • Ammonia Refrigeration (as the sole HHC) is a “Category 1” facility which is supposed to represent 25% of all PSM inspections.
  • If you have an additional covered chemical such as chlorine, the facility may also fall under “Category 4” which is supposed to represent 40% of all PSM inspections.
  • Directs OSHA CSHOs to access the facility’s EPA RMP database information before the inspection.
  • Inspection must include the host employer AND the contract employer
  • Inspection should review ALL OSHA inspection history and abatement verification – must review last six years worth.
  • Inspections will request documents are provided:

Documents Requested Prior to Identifying the Selected Unit(s):

* OSHA 300 logs for the previous three years for the employer and the process-related contractors.

* All contract employee injury and illness logs as required by 1910.119(h)(2)(vi).

* A list of all PSM-covered process/units in the complex.

* A list of all units and the maximum intended inventories of all chemicals (in pounds) in each of the listed units.
* A summary description of the facility’s PSM program.

* Unit process flow diagrams.

* Process narrative descriptions.

* Host employer’s program for evaluating contract employer’s safety information.

* Host employer’s program/safe work practices for controlling the entrance/exit/work of contractors and their workers in covered process areas.

* Emergency Action Plan; and Emergency Response Plan if the facility is also required to comply with 29 CFR 1910.120(q).

* Host employer’s program for periodically evaluating contractor performance.

Documents Requested After the Selected Units are Identified:

* Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) including legends.

* Unit electrical classification documents.

* Descriptions of safety systems (e.g., interlocks, detection or suppression systems).

* Design codes and standards employed for process and equipment in the Selected Unit(s).

* A list of all workers (i.e., hourly and supervisory) presently involved in operating the Selected Units(s), including names, job titles, work shifts, start date in the unit, and the name of the person(s) to whom they report (their supervisor).

* The initial process hazard analysis (PHA) and the most recent update/redo or revalidationfor the Selected Unit (s); this includes PHA reports, PHA worksheets, actions to address findings and recommendations promptly, written schedules for actions to be completed, and documentation of findings and recommendations.

* Safe upper and lower operating limits for the Selected Unit(s).

* A list by title and unit of each PSM incident report; all PSM incident reports for the Selected Unit.

* Contract employer’s safety information and programs (this will be requested from the host employer after it is determined which contractor(s) will be inspected).

* Contractor employer’s documentation of contract workers’ training, including the means used to verify employees’ understanding of the training (this will be requested from the respective contractor employer(s) after it is determined which contractor(s) will be inspected).

* Other documents as specified in the Dynamic Lists.

  • During the walk-around, the CHSO is to observe potential hazards including, but not limited to, pipe work at risk of impact, corroded or leaking equipment, unit or control room siting and trailer location, relief devices and vents that discharge to atmosphere, and ongoing construction and maintenance activities; and solicit input from workers / worker representatives / contract employees.
  • Inspections are focused on Dynamic List questions just like the ChemNEP. Failure to correctly address the questions from the list may broaden the inspection to areas outside the questions. When CSHOs expand the inspection beyond the Dynamic List, they can pull questions from:

* Prior ChemNEP Dynamic List questions
* Old Petroleum NEP (CPL 03-00-010) questions
* CPL 2-2.45 PQV (CPL 2-2.45a) questions
* CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition

Note that this guidance specifically includes the CCPS book “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition” which focuses on PHAs. We have long counseled using the CCPS guidance to better understand what a successful PSM program looks like from both a design perspective as well as an implementation one.

Coupled with the EPA’s announcement that they have begun implementing their enforcement initiative, there has never been a better time to consider a thorough 3rd party Compliance Audit.

2017 SOP Template Updates

January 9, 2017 /

The SOP reference element guideline and RESOP/ROSOP reference  templates have been updated for 2017. The changes are basically broken into two groups: Continuous Improvement and IIAR 7.

Continuous Improvement: As always, there are a lot of little change suggestions that have been built up over time that were expressed in different templates in slightly different ways. Here are some of the change highlights in this section:

  • Section breaks are all now 3pt and merged into a single cell.
  • Stray CG Times font text changed to the default Book Antiqua that is used everywhere else.
  • All RESOPs (and Appropriate ROSOPs) follow this section order:
    1. Normal Startup
    2. Monitor Normal Operations
    3. Emergency Operations
    4. Emergency Shutdown
    5. Manual Shutdown and Isolation
    6. Maintenance Procedure(s) such as Oil Draining and schedules MI tasks.
  • Startup steps were re-organized and harmonized between equipment types.
  • HOA/LOTO steps made more explicit and consistent.
  • Emergency Shutdown section easier to follow and harmonized between equipment types.
  • Added text referencing the Incident Investigation element in the Emergency Shutdown section.
  • Shutdown section now starts with an option to just STOP the unit using the control computer/panel and then provides steps to Isolate and pump it down.
  • Harmonized Operating Limits, Consequences of Deviation and Steps Required to Correct or Avoid Deviation between equipment types. These sections were also harmonized with consistent BOLDing of the relevant variable between the sections as appropriate.

IIAR 7: I have long bypassed IIAR 7 “Developing Operating Procedures for Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” preferring to use the CCPS “Guidelines for Writing Effective Operating and Maintenance Procedures.” While my reference templates still use the CCPS as their basis, I felt it necessary to perform a Gap-Analysis between the templates I’ve been using (and continuously improving) for over a decade and the requirements in IIAR 7-2013. This is especially important because the International Machine Code (IMC) has been updated to point to IIAR 2-2014 (Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems) which references IIAR 7-2013. While I am still not calling IIAR7 RAGAGEP in my PSM programs, I wanted to ensure that the PSM program SOP(s) were compliant with it. While there were no significant changes necessary to make the templates more compliant with IIAR 7, some changes were necessary. Here’s what changes were required for IIAR 7 compliance:

  • Explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up
  • Updated checks during Normal Operations to ensure coverage of all the items listed in IIAR 7
  • Include Supervisory Notification during Shutdowns

For those of you who use these reference templates, they are available in the Google Share in a directory called “IIAR 7 Mods.” After a few months of trials and minor revisions, these templates will replace the existing templates in the main directory. The old templates will be rendered obsolete and moved to the 0bsolete directory.

If you have existing SOPs using the 2016 (or earlier) versions of the template, you will want to compare the new templates with your existing implementation. Please note: These new templates will be the basis for ALL future template modifications / updates.

Below is a list of ALL the changes made to the SOP template section.

  • SOP Guidelines
    • Modified Implementation Policy: Operating Phases: Temporary Operation to include an explanation that a Temporary Operation SOP would require an MOC which would involve supervisory oversight due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.2.3.1(a), 6.3.3.1(a), 6.5.3.1(a), 6.6.3.1(a), 6.7.3.1(a) & 6.8.3.1(a).
  • Compressor RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.2.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.2.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.2.4 & 6.2.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Condenser RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.3.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.3.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.3.4 & 6.3.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Air Unit RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.4.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.4.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.4.4 & 6.4.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Vessel RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.5.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.5.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.5.4 & 6.5.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Recirculating Vessel RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.5.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.5.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.5.4 & 6.5.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
    • Added reminder about documenting oil drained during the oil draining procedural section.
  • Heat Exchanger RESOP Template
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.4.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.4.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.4.4 & 6.4.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Autopurger RESOP Template(s)
    • Re-ordered startup steps to optimize efficiency
    • Added explicit reference to control alarms during Start-up due to the requirements of IIAR 7 6.4.1.1(g)
    • Modified Monitor Normal Operations sections to include explicit checks for all appropriate items in section of IIAR 7 6.4.2.1
    • Optimized HOA / LOTO call-out Made more explicit LOTO call-outs in the Manual Shutdown section.
    • Optimized lead-in language to Manual Shutdown section and closure of Emergency Shutdown section to include Supervisory notification required under of IIAR 7 6.4.4 & 6.4.5.1. Manual Shutdown now starts with an option to just STOP the unit and then offers steps to pump it down.
    • Optimized Emergency Shutdown section to make it easier to follow. Added an explicit requirement to notify supervisory personnel so they can evaluate the need for an Incident Investigation.
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text.
  • Overall System Operation ROSOP 101 Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
  • NH3Vent ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Updated Emergency Operations & Equipment Information section to standardize use of capitalization and bold text. A nearly complete rewrite of the section as well.
  • Car-Seal ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
  • Line Opening (LEO) ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
    • Removed – Non-Permit version of the ROSOP. Still available in 0bsolete archive.
  • Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
  • Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.
  • Quality Assurance (QA) ROSOP Template
    • Updated the Safety & Health section to use more of the IIAR example wording.

Yes, there are a LOT of changes! If you want any assistance or clarification on any of these changes, feel free to contact me.

 

 

Merry Christmas from the EPA!

December 22, 2016 /

Note: See December 2019 Update.

Yesterday the EPA released their long-awaited changes to the RMP rule which will take effect in roughly 60 days. (Don’t worry too much – the earliest actual compliance date for the new requirements is an additional year away and many of them are four years away.)

While the rule isn’t *official* until it’s published in the Federal Register, they have provided the prepublication version with commentary on their website. The document itself is 372 pages long which is impressive considering the original rule is 17 pages. UPDATE: Federal Register publication link.

Here’s part of what the EPA had to say about changes to the rule:

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to Executive Order 13650, is amending its Risk Management Program regulations. The revisions contain several changes to the accident prevention program requirements including an additional analysis of safer technology and alternatives as part of the process hazard analysis for some Program 3 processes, third-party audits and incident investigation root cause analysis for Program 2 and Program 3 processes; enhancements to the emergency preparedness requirements; increased public availability of chemical hazard information; and several other changes to certain regulatory definitions and data elements submitted in risk management plans. These amendments seek to improve chemical process safety, assist local emergency authorities in planning for and responding to accidents, and improve public awareness of chemical hazards at regulated sources.

I have created a 55 page summary that lists:

  • What the new text says.
  • What the new text means.
  • What you must do (and when you must do it!) to become compliant.

You can download that document in Microsoft Word (so you can make your own personal notes) at this link: 40CFR68 – 2016 Amendments BDC 122116.

Obviously, there are going to be many changes required to your element guidelines and practices. RC&E will be updating our template program to become compliant with the new requirements in the first quarter of 2017 and will make these updated documents available to our clients as they are completed.

Updated link to the EPA documents: Click Here

Link to our summary: 40CFR68 – 2016 Amendments BDC 122116

Updates:

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061217

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Pencil-Whipping can Kill

December 15, 2016 /

What is it? Pencil-whipping is when you complete a form, record, or document without having performed the implied work or without supporting data or evidence.

Here are some common examples in NH3 refrigeration:

  • Completing “word orders” without conducting the work
  • “Signing off” on SOP reviews or PHA revalidations without actually reviewing or revalidating the documents.
  • Certifying training – or signing training attendance forms – without the training actually occurring.

Why take it seriously? There are several reasons, but here are some obvious ones:

  • You can be prosecuted for false statements resulting in fines and/or jail time.
  • There is significant legal liability if the action leads to an incident.
  • You can be fired for false statements
  • There can be significant safety repercussions to documenting work that wasn’t done.

I want to briefly focus on the last one – what can happen when you document that work was done when it actually wasn’t. If you are being assigned a task, we have to assume that the performance of that task is important to the system as a whole.

Imagine your job was to inspect some equipment that was prone to long-term wear – equipment that was relied upon for normal function. Now imagine that you didn’t conduct those inspections leading the users of that equipment to believe it was in proper working order. They are relying for their safety on YOUR lie!

Here’s what that can lead to:

And here’s what can happen when people investigate the incident:

Thursday morning, the General Manager and CEO of the Board Safety Commission released a statement regarding the firings: “…I want the Board, our employees and our customers to know that this review revealed a disturbing level of indifference, lack of accountability, and flagrant misconduct in a portion of Metro’s track department which is completely intolerable. Further, it is reprehensible that any supervisor or mid-level manager would tolerate or encourage this behavior, or seek to retaliate against those who objected. It is also entirely unacceptable to me that any employee went along with this activity, rather than exercise a safety challenge, or any of the multiple avenues available to protect themselves, their coworkers, and the riding public.

Since the derailment occurred, we have either taken action or are in the process of taking disciplinary actions involving 28 individuals. This represents nearly half of the track inspection department and includes BOTH management and frontline track employees.

Six employees have been terminated, including 4 track inspectors and 2 supervisors

Six more track inspectors are pending termination or unpaid suspension; and 10 more are pending possible discipline pending the outcome of the administrative process

Another supervisor termination is underway; and two more supervisors are pending the outcome of the administrative process

One Superintendent was demoted to Supervisor

One Assistant General Superintendent was demoted to Superintendent

One assistant superintendent separated from Metro before the review concluded

In closing: Pencil-Whipping is immoral, illegal and just plain wrong. Don’t do it.

First RC&E PSM Class Complete. Second Class Scheduled

December 7, 2016 /

2016-book-cover

 

Last month we wrapped up our first RC&E Customer PSM class in Fort Worth, Texas. The participants spent four days learning about PSM and sharing ideas, challenges and solutions. Due to the mix of skill levels (First-timers to Experienced Practitioners) and Organizational Position (Operators, Safety Professionals and Managers) the class was a lot of fun for all involved.

Here’s what some of the participants had to say about the class:

“With quite a lot of pre-existing PSM knowledge, I still came away with lessons learned.”

“…this class did a great job in explaining how the PSM system works.”

“Very thorough… I won’t feel like I am fumbling in the dark anymore.”

“Engaging presentation of complex material. A valuable class”

“Very in-depth. Informative. Answered questions before I got to ask them!”

This class is exclusively for RC&E Customers because it’s designed around the specific PSM program that RC&E has written for them. If you are interested in attending the next class in June, you can get more information from the Class Flyer or Register Now to save your spot!

APR’s aren’t Magic

October 17, 2016 /

When I see people writing “Have a Full-Face APR (Air Purifying Respirator) nearby, within arm’s reach” in their Line/Equipment Opening (aka Line Break) procedures, my blood-pressure shoots through the roof. Yes, I know I am a rather excitable guy by nature, but there is a legitimate reason for my anger here. 

This incident narrative is why: 

 It is believed the oil drain valve was initially clogged as the employee opened it a full three turns before any ammonia came out. When liquid exited the valve and struck the employee he fell face first on concrete in hallway.   “Convulsions” were observed by other employees and the operator was unable to self-rescue due to lung spasms. The other employees had no access to PPE and could not assist the victim. 

Would a Full-Face APR within “arm’s reach” have been useful to that employee AFTER he was struck in the face with liquid ammonia? 

NO. IT WOULD NOT.

With NO protection, that operator was essentially doomed the second the NH3 left the pipe and struck him.

PPE stands for Personal Protective Equipment, not Potentially Protective Equipment.

PPE isn’t some sort of magic relic that provides protection while you are within a certain radius of its location. It works when – and ONLY when – you use it properly. This same foolish thinking that allows people to require APR’s “nearby” could be applied to seat-belts with about the same effectiveness: “Well, no he wasn’t wearing the seat-belt during the accident. Funny thing: the darned seat-belt was right there next to him and he still went out the window when the car hit the tree.”

Now, imagine instead that the operator in that incident narrative was wearing a Full-Face APR. While Full-Face APR’s aren’t designed for liquid exposure, would he have survived if he were wearing one? Almost certainly, YES. Certainly his odds would have improved astronomically. He may well have suffered severe burns, but it is very likely that the Full-Face APR would have afforded him enough protection so that he would have been able to evacuate himself from the area and seek a safety shower to minimize the damage to his skin.

Please, THINK about your policies and REQUIRE that Full-Face APR’s are worn during ALL Line & Equipment openings.

102417 Update: Here’s a picture that perfectly illustrates the uselessness of having PPE “nearby”…

We’re all in this together!

October 13, 2016 /

Our PSM Engineer, Josh Latovich, and Compliance Services Manager, Brian Chapin, were in Las Vegas last week for RETA’s Annual Conference. Below are Brian’s thoughts on the event:

vegas-skyline

It was great to meet so many friends and colleagues in Las Vegas last week for RETA’s annual conference. While all business is about personal relationships, most people recognize that the Ammonia Refrigeration industry is a uniquely tight-knit group. We’ve always been strong supporters of RETA because their focus is on the Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians – the actual ground troops that do the work!

The comradery of the process operators in our industry is second to none and it’s always good to get the opportunity to assemble in one place for a few days to discuss common issues. A common theme this year in our conversations was one that has been very prevalent for the last few years, but only seems to be getting worse: the operator shortage.

For nearly a decade now there just aren’t enough skilled operators to go around and that has only highlighted the need for quality training for the new people we’re drafting into the field. There have been third-party solutions for overall refrigeration training for years and these programs have value, but they must serve to augment quality in-house training, not replace it.

What a quality in-house training program looks like is a very complicated subject and one we may write about at some point, but what I’d like to talk about today is something related to that topic: the power imbalance between the new and the seasoned operator.

While driving to Arkansas for a client visit earlier this week I was listening to a book on tape: Malcolm Gladwell’s “Outliers: The Story of Success.” In a chapter on Airplane crashes he spoke of a very interesting statistic: The plain is more likely to crash when the Captain is flying than when the First Officer is flying. Isn’t that odd? Wouldn’t you expect the more seasoned, more experienced Captain to be safer than the comparatively less seasoned and experienced First Officer?

He also offered what many psychologists believe is the reason for this: The Captain is very likely to point out a mistake made by the First Officer because they are in an elevated position compared to them. It is much more difficult – psychologically speaking – for the junior officer to challenge the Captain! With so many experienced operators training new ones, couldn’t we also be affected by this sort of power imbalance?

So, here are a couple thoughts for those of you in the field to help us all avoid the problems caused by power imbalance:

If you are the more seasoned, experienced technician:

  • Are you making yourself approachable?
  • Are you actively soliciting input from your colleagues on your plan of action?
  • Are you rewarding questions about your plan of action or punishing them?
  • Are you considering questions about your plan as teaching moments rather than challenges to your “authority?”

If you are the less seasoned, experience technician:

  • Are you speaking up if you have concerns or questions about the plan of action?
  • Are you insisting that you are heard rather than just making sure you have said your piece?
  • Are you posing your concerns or questions as opportunities for your colleagues to train you?

It’s the last bullet of each of those that I want to focus on briefly. Whether you are the questioner or the person answering the question, you need to look at these moments of confusion as teaching moments. Saying “That’s stupid” or “I wouldn’t do it that way,” is perceived as a challenge and isn’t likely to get a constructive response. Saying “Help me understand why you are doing it this way,” “Is there a reason not to do it this other way,” or “Let me explain why I’m doing it this way” starts a dialogue between people that can bring you both together.

By asking yourself the above questions, the experienced technician will soon come to understand that “teaching” someone often helps them clarify their thoughts and makes them understand their own actions better. The inexperienced technician will find that training isn’t just something that happens in a classroom – their day is full of learning opportunities.

Remember, we’re all in this together.

When does a Car-Seal program make sense for Industrial Ammonia Refrigeration systems?

September 9, 2016 /

First off: What is a Car-Seal program and what does it do? 

A Car-Seal program is designed, implemented and managed to ensure that safety-critical valves within the covered process are maintained in their safety-critical position / setting during normal system operation. If the position / setting of a safety-critical valve is to be changed, it provides a procedure that functions as an administrative control to make this change safely.

Car-Sealing a valve OPEN or CLOSED is used ONLY if opening or closing that valve during normal operation could result in a Severe Safety Incident. Car-Sealed valves are usually designated on the P&ID’s as Car-Sealed OPEN (CSO) and Car-Sealed CLOSED (CSC), and are physically identified as Car-Sealed in its designated position / setting.

In order to more readily identify the location of the intended Car-Seals in the field, as well as the NORMALLY SAFE valve position / setting, the tags will be secured to the valve using COLOR CODED PLASTIC TIE STRAPS.

carseal

To put it bluntly: Car-Seals are placed on valves where REALLY bad things can happen if you move them from their normal (Safety Critical) position without taking precautions!

Where are they used in Industrial Ammonia Refrigeration Systems? 

You should already have at least two Administrative Controls (safeguards) meant to minimize the hazard of opening and closing the wrong valves: Written SOPs and Trained Operators. The Car-Seal program is meant to add a third layer of protection on top of those two when changing the position of the valve could reasonably result in a Severe Safety Incident.

Severe Safety Incident – shall mean any incident which could result in any one or more of the following results:

  • An OSHA Recordable accident, fatality, one or more employees/contractors hospitalized
  • Any fire requiring the use of more than one (1) portable extinguisher or one wheeled unit to completely extinguish
  • Any environmental incident involving a regulated material which violates any of our permits or requires disposal of a hazardous waste
  • Any incident which activates or disables a pressure safety device.
  • Any event which had the clear potential for sudden loss of human life, either within the plant or beyond the fence line, which would result directly from a chemical release, fire or other safety-related incident
  • Any event which required an offsite notification of any type agency (fire, LEPC, EPA, OSHA, County Officials, City Officials)
  • Any event in which the site alarm system activates or is disabled (excluding false alarms and tests)

While the decision as to which situations could reasonably result in a Severe Safety Incident are best left to the PHA team, the following are common situations where they have been used:

  • On the CD Isolation Valve of a Condenser Coil
  • On the Inlet or Outlet Isolation Valve of a Thermosyphon Heat Exchanger
  • On any liquid cooling Heat Exchanger without a relief device*
  • Where a shutoff valve is placed before or after a relief device*
  • At Isolation Valves for dead-end or Future Expansion legs.

* A relief device in this case means a device to relieve excess pressure. While relief valves are common solutions, other examples include checkvalves, pressure-relieving regulators, EPCS solenoids, etc.

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